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NOTES
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab: The Fourth
Amendment Hangs in the Balance
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the fundamental purpose
of the fourth amendment's1 reasonableness requirement as safeguarding "the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials." 2 Prior to 1967, the Court applied the fourth amendment only in cases
involving searches3 undertaken to enforce criminal laws, protecting against "un-
reasonable searches and seizures" by requiring warrants based on probable cause
in all but a few narrowly defined situations.4 The Court's decision in Camara v.
Municipal Court 5 extended the protection of the fourth amendment to civil
searches. 6 It also introduced the balancing test as a method of determining
whether a search is reasonable under the fourth amendment. 7
Although initially applied only in cases involving minimal intrusions, this
method of balancing the government's interest in a particular search against the
privacy interests the search infringes gradually expanded to encompass all civil
searches to determine the practicability of requiring probable cause. 8 The fourth
amendment protection retained substance during this expansion through the
Court's requirement that the searching authority have some reasonable suspi-
cion of wrongdoing in cases in which balancing determined that a probable
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause .. "). The fourth amendment is enforceable against the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
2. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); see also Strossen, The Fourth
Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative
Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1174 n.2 (1988) ("the Court generally identifies the protection of
privacy as the fourth amendment's paramount purpose.").
3. An intrusion is a "search" under the fourth amendment when it violates a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). An
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy where he has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
(objective). Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
4. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances
present would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense was or is being
committed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1081 (5th ed. 1979); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238 (1983) ("The task of an issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision
whether, given all the circumstances.., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.").
5. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
6. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530-34.
7. Id. at 536-37 ("Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails."). One
commentator has defined balancing technically as "a judicial opinion that analyzes a constitutional
question by identifying interests implicated by the case and reaches a decision or constructs a rule of
constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly assigning values to the identified interests." Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 945 (1987).
8. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
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cause requirement would be impractical. 9 In National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab'0 the Court created a new standard for determining reasona-
bleness under the fourth amendment by employing the balancing test to find
highly personal drug tests reasonable despite the absence of any suspicion of
drug use among the government employees tested. 1
This Note traces the development of the balancing test from its introduc-
tion to fourth amendment jurisprudence through its establishment as the stan-
dard of reasonableness for civil searches in Von Raab.12 It analyzes the
appropriateness of balancing as a standard and examines the governmental inter-
ests and personal privacy rights considered by the Court as well as other factors
that the Court either consciously or subconsciously placed on the scales. Fol-
lowing a proposed modification of the Von Raab standard requiring individual
suspicion and the least intrusive alternative search method available, the Note
concludes that the balancing test is uncontrollable and impractical as a standard
for determining reasonableness. Consequently, the "indefeasible right"'13 sought
to be protected under the fourth amendment is now subject to intrusion for the
convenience of government and at the expense of personal liberty.
The United States Customs Service, a bureau of the Department of the
Treasury, is the federal agency responsible for processing persons, carriers,
cargo, and mail entering the United States, collecting revenue from imports, and
enforcing customs and related laws.14 A major responsibility of the Customs
Service is the interdiction and seizure of illegal drugs and contraband, an often
hazardous mission requiring close interaction with criminals and necessitating
the possession and possible use of firearms. 15
In December 1985 the Commissioner of Customs, William Von Raab, es-
tablished a task force to investigate the possibility of implementing a drug
screening program for the Customs Service. 16 No evidence of drug use among
the Service's employees existed at that time; indeed, the Commissioner himself
expressed his belief that "Customs is largely drug-free." 17 Nevertheless, because
the obvious dangers of drug interdiction demanded drug-free and law-abiding
officers and because "unfortunately no segment of society is immune from the
threat of illegal drug use," the Commissioner announced implementation of a
drug-testing program in May 1986.18
9. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
10. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
11. Id. at 1397-98.
12. Although this Note is confined to a discussion of balancing in fourth amendment cases,
balancing also has been introduced and employed in cases involving the first, fifth, sixth, eighth, and
fourteenth amendments. See generally Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63
N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 16, 18 (1988) (arguing that the trend of using broad, bright-line rules when balanc-
ing should be replaced by narrow, cautious, and incremental decision making).
13. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
14. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1387.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1388.
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The program made urinalysis testing for five illegal drugs 19 a prerequisite
for promotion to positions with the Service meeting one of three criteria: direct
involvement with drug interdiction, possession and use of firearms, or handling
of classified materials.20 All employees qualifying for covered positions had to
pass drug screening as the final condition of promotion, and employees failing
the screening without satisfactory explanation became subject to dismissal from
the Service. 2 1 The program required testing only of employees seeking promo-
tions to covered positions; those already working in the covered positions were
excluded from the program.22
On behalf of current Customs Service employees seeking covered positions,
a union of federal employees and a union official brought suit against the Com-
missioner alleging that the testing program violated the employees' rights under
the fourth amendment by permitting searches not based on individual suspi-
cion. 23 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
though recognizing the legitimate interests of the government, granted an in-
junction, finding the program a "dragnet approach of testing all workers...
made without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion [that is] repugnant to
the United States Constitution" and violative of legitimate expectations of
privacy. 2
4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed that the
tests were searches,25 but a divided panel vacated the injunction, finding the
searches "reasonable" under the fourth amendment.26 Noting the Service's ef-
forts to minimize the intrusion into personal privacy, the "pernicious impact" of
illicit drugs on American society, and the employees' reduced privacy expecta-
19. Id. at 1389. A laboratory tested the samples for the presence of marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
amphetamines, and phencyclidine (PCP). Id.
20. Id. at 1388.
21. Id. at 1389. The Service advised employees who qualified for covered positions that their
promotions were contingent upon successful completion of drug screening. Id. at 1388. An in-
dependent contractor conducted the tests, which were carefully monitored to prevent adulteration of
samples. Id. Protective measures included the presence of a monitor of the same sex to listen for the
normal sounds of urination and to secure and seal the sample immediately. Id. No actual visual
observation occurred. Id. The urine sample reached the laboratory through a traceable chain of
custody, and enzyme-multiplied-immunoassay technique (EMIT) tests were performed. Id. at 1388-
89. The laboratory confirmed samples testing positive by a second test using the more accurate gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) method. Id. at 1389. Employees testing positive
were questioned for possible explanations by a medical review officer. Those not providing satisfac-
tory explanations were subject to dismissal. Id. Test results were not turned over to any other
agency or to criminal prosecutors, however, without the employee's written consent. Id.
22. Id. at 1390.
23. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986), rev'd,
816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). The union sought
the injunction solely on the ground of violation of the fourth amendment and not on the basis of the
penumbral right of privacy developed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 181
(5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
24. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 387 (E.D. La. 1986),
rev'd, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
25. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
26. Id. at 180, 182.
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tions, 27 the court found that the government's interest in detecting drug users
among employees outweighed the employees' legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy.2 8 Having so balanced, the court deemed the tests reasonable despite the
lack of individualized suspicion. 29 The dissenting judge, also employing the bal-
ancing test, considered the program ineffective in achieving the government's
goal and therefore not sufficient to outweigh the privacy expectations of the
employees. 30
The United States Supreme Court, balancing for the first time in the ab-
sence of some quantum of suspicion, held that suspicionless testing of employees
seeking promotion to positions involving drug interdiction and possession of fire-
arms was reasonable under the fourth amendment. 31 Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy repeatedly emphasized the dangers of illicit drugs. 32 Recogniz-
ing the Service's attempts to minimize the test's intrusiveness, the Court held
that the government's "compelling interest in preventing the promotion of drug
users" outweighed the diminished privacy interests of these employees. 3 3
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented, recognizing the extreme
privacy traditionally afforded the act of urination and criticizing the finding of
reasonableness in the absence of any suspicion of employee drug use. 34 Explain-
ing the majority opinion as "symbolic opposition to drug use,"' 35 Justice Scalia
criticized the lack of proof that the tests would solve the problems that the Ser-
vice claimed created the need for the program. 36
"27. Id. at 177-79. The court stated that the Service had attempted to minimize the intrusive-
ness of the searches by providing for aural rather than visual observation and by scheduling the tests
in advance rather than conducting them by surprise. Id. at 177.
The court explained that the privacy expectations of the employees were diminished because the
searches were not performed for the discovery of evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions and
because "government employees may be subject to searches or other restraints on their liberties that
would be impermissible in the absence of the employment relationship." Id. at 178.
28. Id. at 179-80.
29. Id. at 180.
30. Id. at 183-84 (Hill, J., dissenting) ("An important weight in this balance is that the means
chosen to accomplish the governmental interest must effectively achieve that goal."). Judge Hill
argued that applicants who used drugs could abstain from drug use upon receiving notice and
thereby pass their tests. Id. at 184 (Hill, J., dissenting). He also noted that the program did not test
employees already working in covered positions. Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).
31. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396 (1989). The Court found the record inadequate to determine
the reasonableness of testing employees seeking promotions to positions involving handling of classi-
fied information and, therefore, remanded this issue for further proceedings. Id. at 1396-97.
32. Id. at 1392 ("one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our popula-
tion"), 1395 ("drug abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting our society today"), 1397
(noting "[tlhe Government's compelling interest in preventing promotion of drug users").
33. Id. at 1397. The Court found diminished expectations of privacy due to the civil nature of
the search, the employment setting, and the "unique" demands of drug interdiction and law enforce-
ment, which required involvement with drugs and possession of weapons. Id. at 1393-94.
34. Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did not criticize the balancing methodol-
ogy. Instead, he applied the test but struck a different balance, finding that the employees' privacy
interests outweighed the government's goal. Id. at 1398-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1398-401 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although the majority gave statistics of fatalities,
injuries, bribes, and other dangers confronted by employees, see id. at 1392-93, there was no evidence
that these occurrences were related to drug use. Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At best, the
majority only speculated that possible ill effects potentially caused by drug use could be avoided. Id.
at 1399-400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented for the same reasons
he enumerated in his dissent in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Associa-
tion,37 decided the same day as Von Raab.38 Emphasizing the significance of the
fundamental right to privacy and the necessity of the probable cause standard in
preserving this right,39 Justice Marshall criticized the expanded application of
the balancing test to allow full-scale searches without probable cause or some
level of individual suspicion.40 Charging the majority with being "swept away
by society's obsession with stopping the scourge of illegal drugs," 4 1 Justice Mar-
shall interpreted its opinion as "eliminating altogether the probable cause re-
quirement for civil searches." 42
Appreciation of the potential consequences of the Court's unprecedented
extension of the balancing test in Von Raab requires an analysis of the cases
introducing and expanding the application of the balancing test to its present
position as the standard for determining reasonableness under the fourth amend-
ment.43 The Court extended the protection of the fourth amendment to civil
searches in Camara v. Municipal Court,44 refusing to find that fourth amend-
ment protections served only those persons suspected of criminal behavior.4 5 In
Camara a lessee faced criminal charges of violating a housing code after he re-
fused to allow an inspection of his apartment by an official who had no search
warrant.4 6 The inspection was based on an appraisal of conditions of the entire
area and was not based on individual probable cause or suspicion. 47 Finding the
fourth amendment applicable to inspections of an administrative nature, the
Court held that it could only evaluate the reasonableness of the search by "bal-
ancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails."'48
Weighing the governmental and societal interests in preventing the "develop-
ment of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety" 49 against
the privacy interests of the individual whose dwelling was searched, the Court
held that housing inspections were reasonable even absent individual probable
37. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). Skinner involved the constitutionality of imposing drug tests on
railroad employees involved in train accidents. See infra notes 106-19 and accompanying text.
38. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 1424 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 1433 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1425 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. The fourth amendment does not expressly require a warrant and probable cause as indis-
pensable elements of reasonableness, see supra note 1, and the Court has not required warrants in
every circumstance. See, eg., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (warrantless search
of automobile valid if based on probable cause); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)
(warrantless search in exigent circumstances valid if based on probable cause). Nevertheless, prior
to the introduction of the balancing test the Court had consistently required probable cause before
finding a search reasonable. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1424 n. 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The first
and leading case of minimally intrusive search held valid when based on suspicion short of probable
cause is Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1963).").
44. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
45. Id. at 530.
46. Id. at 525.
47. Id. at 536.
48. Id. at 536-37.
49. Id. at 535.
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cause. Among the factors considered by the Court were: 1) the long history of
judicial and public acceptance of such inspections; 2) the public interest in en-
suring that hazardous conditions did not develop; 3) the lack of acceptable alter-
native methods of detecting violations; and 4) the limited invasion of privacy due
to the inspections being neither personal nor aimed at discovery of criminal evi-
dence. 50 Introducing the balancing test as a new fourth amendment methodol-
ogy for certain civil searches, the Court approved the search despite the lack of a
level of suspicion sufficient to constitute individual probable cause.51
In Terry v. Ohio, 52 decided only one year after Camara, the Court intro-
duced the balancing test to criminal searches under the fourth amendment to
justify a police officer's brief "stop and frisk" search based on less than probable
cause.53 The officer, having observed three men and suspecting them of "casing
a job," approached the men, identified himself as a police officer, and requested
their names and an explanation of the nature of their activity.54 When the men
"mumbled something" in response, the officer, believing the men might be
armed, detained them and "patted down" the outside of their clothing. This
procedure led to the discovery of two loaded weapons.55 Stating that "the spe-
cific content and incidents of ... [the fourth amendment] right must be shaped
by the context in which it is asserted," the Court enumerated the unsatisfactory
results of requiring a warrant and probable cause in this type of situation5 6 and
invoked the balancing test to determine the reasonableness of these searches.5 7
The Court found that the governmental and societal interest in protecting the
safety of police officers outweighed the intrusion of privacy necessary to ensure
the absence of dangerous weapons.5 8 To reach an acceptable balance between
the government's interest and the safeguards of the fourth amendment, the
Court created a two-step inquiry, finding stop and frisk type searches reasonable
when "the officer's action was justified at its inception" and the search "was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place."5 9 This test subsequently came to be recognized as the "rea-
50. Id. at 537.
51. Id. at 534-35. Although the Court avoided individual probable cause as a requirement of
reasonableness, it held that inspectors still must obtain warrants in order to protect citizens from the
discretionary judgment of officials in the field. Id. at 539-40. The Court also maintained the require-
ment of probable cause, which in this type of situation would be based on an inspection of an entire
area rather than a particular dwelling. Id. at 538.
Following Camara, the Court recognized the "administrative search" exception in lieu of indi-
vidual probable cause or individual suspicion when the enumerated criteria were present. See James,
The Constitutionality of Federal Employee Drug Testing: National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 38 AM. U.L. REv. 109, 126-27 (1988) (analyzing the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit).
52. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
53. Id. at 16, 30-31.
54. Id. at 6-7.
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 8-9.
57. Id. at 21 ("there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails" (quoting
Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37)).
58. Id. at 23-25, 27.
59. Id. at 19-20. Although the government's interest was great, the Court still recognized the
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sonableness of the circumstances" standard employed by the Court to uphold a
search on a level of suspicion less than probable cause. 60
Under this new exception, a search would be "justified at its inception" if
the officer was able to point to "specific and articulable facts" 61 in which "a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger."'62 Because the "sole justifica-
tion" of the stop and frisk search in Terry was the protection of the officer and
those nearby, the search was reasonable in scope only if confined "to an intru-
sion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instru-
ments for the assault of the police officer."'63 Although Terry involved a
criminal search and was strictly limited to its particular facts,64 because it was
the first decision not requiring probable cause 65 the decision has been cited re-
peatedly by the Court in developing a methodology for determining the reasona-
bleness of civil searches.66
Another exception to the general requirement of probable cause in civil
searches resulted from the Court's use of the balancing test in cases involving
searches and inspections at the United States border. In United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce 67 the Court addressed the reasonableness of roving border pa-
trol stops, not based on probable cause or individual suspicion, for brief ques-
tioning of the occupants of vehicles as to their residency and immigration
status.68 The Court balanced the government's interest in preventing unlawful
entry into the United States and the "absence of practical alternatives" 69 against
nature and quality of the fourth amendment right. Id. at 17. For this reason, the Court "struck a
balance" that satisfied the government interest but still protected the rights of the individual with
objective standards. Id. at 27. The Court also strictly limited its decision to relax probable cause for
"stop and frisk" searches to situations in which the police officer's life may be threatened. Id. at 16
n.12 & 27.
60. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 880-82 (1975).
61. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. "This demand for specificity in the information upon which police
action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at
21 n.18.
62. Id. at 27. The level of suspicion necessary in this limited circumstance did not have to
reach probable cause, but did require more than a "hunch" or "unparticularized suspicion" that the
individual present was armed and dangerous. Id. at 21-22.
The Court has interpreted the requirement of "justified at inception" as requiring the presence
of a reasonable ground for suspecting that the search will turn up the evidence sought. O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987); T.LO., 469 U.S. at 341-42.
63. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
64. Id. at 8-9.
65. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1424 n.1 (1989) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
66. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725-26 (probable cause not required for searches occurring in the
workplace); T.LO., 469 U.S. at 341 (probable cause not required for searches in the "special" school
environment); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (probable cause not re-
quired to justify brief stops for questioning of residency status by roving border patrols).
67. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
68. Id. at 876. The Court had decided previously that probable cause was required for full-
scale searches made by roving border patrols. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273
(1973).
69. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881. The length of the border and the numerous points of entry
necessitated the use of roving patrols; fixed checkpoints could not possibly cover this massive area.
1990]
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the minimal interference to the individual in being stopped to answer ques-
tions.70 Relying on Terry v. Ohio, the Court held that brief stops limited to
questioning in the immediate proximity of the border satisfied the fourth amend-
ment if based on reasonable suspicion of the presence of illegal aliens. 71 The
Court expressly refused "to let the Border Patrol dispense entirely with the re-
quirement that officers must have a reasonable suspicion to justify roving patrol
stops '' 72 because of the unreasonableness of allowing interference with motorists
rightfully using the highway without any grounds for suspecting that they had
violated the law. 73
The Court created another "border search" exception in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,74 this time addressing the reasonableness of the Border Patrol's
operation of permanent checkpoints at or near the nation's borders. At these
checkpoints Border Patrol officers slowed and visually screened all vehicles, de-
taining for brief questioning and possible further action any vehicles arousing
suspicion of the presence of illegal entrants. 75 The Court, although not ex-
pressly following Camara,76 balanced the history of acceptance of border inspec-
tions, 77 the great public interest demanding the inspections, 78 and the lack of
acceptable alternatives79 against the minimal intrusion involved80 to find the
checkpoint procedures reasonable under the fourth amendment without individ-
The border patrol offered evidence disclosing the effectiveness of the patrols in apprehending illegal
entrants and smugglers. See id. at 879.
70. Id. at 880 ("The Government tells us that a stop by roving patrol 'usually consumes no
more than a minute' .... '[A]II that is required of the vehicle's occupants is a response to a brief
question or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing the right to be in the United
States.' ").
71. Id. at 883 ("a requirement of reasonable suspicion for stops allows the Government ade-
quate means of guarding the public interest and also protects residents of the border areas from
indiscriminate official interference").
Although the factors weighed by the Court-great government interest, minimal intrusion and
absence of alternatives-were similar to those considered in Camara, the Court did not attempt to
justify the searches under the administrative search exception. The Court chose instead to require
the presence of particular suspicion that a vehicle was carrying illegal aliens, thereby avoiding the
subjection of those lawfully using the highways to the unnecessary and potentially unlimited interfer-
ence that would occur without such a requirement. Id. at 882-83.
72. Id. at 882.
73. Id. at 883.
74. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
75. Id. at 546-47.
76. Id. at 564-65. The Court relied heavily on Camara, but refused to follow it completely
because of Camara's requirement of a warrant. Id. The Court concluded that a warrant require-
ment would be impracticable for checkpoint procedures. Id. at 565.
77. Id. at 556-57.
78. Id. at 556.
79. Id. at 556-57; see also id. at 553-54 (discussing the effectiveness of the checkpoints).
80. Id. at 557-59 (noting that most motorists were allowed to resume their progress without
oral inquiry or close visual observation). The Court found the privacy intrusion was minimized
because the officers searched every passing vehicle instead of randomly searching a few. Id. at 558-
59. Because the other motorists could plainly see the procedure being implemented, it was not a
surprise search for which they could not prepare. Id. at 559.
This logic has been criticized, however, under the belief that some individuals may be more
upset by massive intrusions than by individualized ones. See Strossen, supra note 2, at 1197. Profes-
sor Strossen also states that advance notice may cause more anxiety due to a longer anticipation of
the search. Id. Finally, Strossen believes some individuals suffer greater embarrassment when sub-
jected to searches in public view. Id. at 1197-98.
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ual suspicion.81 The Court strictly limited this use of the balancing test as a
means of avoiding the warrant requirement of the administrative search excep-
tion82 to minimal interference at the checkpoints with "'[a]ny further detention
[having to] be based on consent or probable cause.' "83
To this point, the Court maintained probable cause as the requisite level of
suspicion for reasonableness in civil and criminal cases with certain narrowly
limited exceptions in which the Court determined reasonableness by balancing
the governmental and individual interests involved. Recognizing the importance
of fourth amendment protection, the Court carefully had controlled the balanc-
ing test by applying it only in cases involving minimal intrusions of privacy and
then by requiring the presence of reasonable suspicion 84 or the existence of cer-
tain factors under the administrative search exception. In subsequent cases the
Court's control of the test weakened as a result of the adoption of balancing,
under the guise of "special needs," into its methodology for determining reason-
ableness in all civil searches. 85 The early cases recognizing exceptions to the
probable cause requirement proved to be the wedge forewarned by Justice Brad-
ley more than 100 years ago in his motto "obsta principiis."'86
In New Jersey v. T.L. 87 the Court took a major step toward establishing
balancing as the rule for determining reasonableness by declaring that "[tihe
determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of
searches requires 'balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails.' "88 A school principal discovered marijuana and other drug par-
aphernalia while searching a student's purse for cigarettes after a teacher caught
the student smoking.89 After finding the fourth amendment applicable to public
school officials, the Court weighed the school's legitimate interest in maintaining
authority and discipline through immediate action 90 against the student's inter-
81. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562.
82. Id. at 564-65.
83. Id. at 567 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975)). But see
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (applying the border search theory to
allow a lengthy detention until a suspect had a bowel movement to check for alimentary canal drug
smuggling on less than probable cause).
84. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
85. See infra notes 97-120 and accompanying text.
86. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). Justice Bradley stated:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegiti-
mate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure .... It is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. Their motto should be 'obsta principiis.'
Id.
A nonliteral translation of this latin phrase is "Resist the opening wedge!" LaFave, The Forgot-
ten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 ARIz. L. REv. 291, 294
(1986).
87. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
88. Id. at 337 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (emphasis
added).
89. Although the teacher caught the student smoking, the student denied the teacher's accusa-
tion when confronted by the principal. Id. at 328.
90. Id. at 339-41.
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est in privacy and concluded that "the legality of a search of a student should
depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
search."9 1 The Court held the method for determining the reasonableness of
this and "of any search" 92 was the two-step inquiry set out in Terry v. Ohio.9 3
Justice Blackmun concurred, but disagreed with the majority's implication
that balancing was the rule rather than the exception for determining reasona-
bleness under the fourth amendment.94 He stated that probable cause was the
rule except "in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause re-
quirement impracticable."' 95 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
strongly dissented from the majority's unprecedented formulation of a reasona-
bleness standard "whose only definite content is that it is not the same test as the
'probable cause' standard."'96
The Court modified its declaration of balancing as the standard for all
fourth amendment searches in O'Connor v. Ortega,97 relying on Justice Black-
mun's opinion in T.L.O. While investigating possible misconduct of an em-
ployee, public hospital officials, claiming to be inventorying state property,
discovered items later used against the employee in a hearing for his discharge. 98
Recognizing that a warrant and probable cause were settled as the standard of
reasonableness, the Court adopted Justice Blackmun's proposed standard, in-
voking balancing when "'special needs, beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement make the ... probable-cause requirement impracticable.' "99
Under this new standard, the Court first found the employer's interest to be
"substantially different from the normal needs of law enforcement,"' t ° hence a
"special need." After finding the existence of a "special need," the Court bal-
anced the government's interest in "the efficient and proper operation of the
workplace" against the reduced privacy expectations of employees and found
warrants and probable cause to be impracticable.10 1 The Court then applied the
two-step inquiry set out in Terry as the standard for determining the reasonable-
ness of the search. 102
91. Id. at 341.
92. Id.
93. Id. For a discussion of the two-step reasonableness standard, see supra notes 59-63 and
accompanying text.
94. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun's statement seems to imply that all
civil searches should be evaluated by balancing because civil searches are based on needs other than
law enforcement.
96. Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens also filed
a separate opinion arguing for the application of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 370 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
97. 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 713 (plurality opinion).
99. Id. at 725 (plurality opinion) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
100. Id. at 724 (plurality opinion). Although the Court found the employer's need substantially
different from that of law enforcement, it held that searches for work-related and investilgatory pur-
poses was a special need. Id. at 725 (plurality opinion).
101. Id. at 721-25 (plurality opinion).
102. Id. at 725-26 (plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun, who created the special needs analysis
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The new standard resulting from T.L.O. and O'Connor allowed courts to
find any civil search reasonable, based on the Terry decision's two-step inquiry,
if its balancing of interests found a warrant and probable cause impracticable.
This reasonableness standard required a search to be "justified at its inception"
and "reasonably related in scope" to the circumstances justifying the intru-
sion.10 3 A search would be "justified at its inception" if reasonable grounds
existed that justified the suspicion that the search would produce the evidence
sought."14 Although the searches in T.L. 0. and O'Connor had been found justi-
fied at their inceptions in the presence of individual suspicion, in both cases the
Court expressly denied that individual suspicion was an essential element of rea-
sonable suspicion. 105
The Court decided that reasonable suspicion could be present with less than
individual suspicion in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association.10 6
Based on evidence of drug and alcohol abuse among a significant number of
employees 10 7 and evidence that such abuse had contributed to a large number of
serious accidents,108 the Federal Railroad Administration promulgated regula-
tions mandating drug and alcohol tests for certain employees by blood and urine
analysis. 109 The regulations provided for testing of all employees directly in-
volved in "impact accidents" or "major train accidents" immediately after such
accidents ocurred.110 Because the tests attempted to ensure the safety of the
public and other employees, and not the needs of law enforcement, the Court
determined the government's interest in testing to be a special need. 1 The
Court then balanced the government's interests against the employees' expecta-
tions of privacy in their blood and urine and determined that warrants and prob-
able cause were impractical. 112 Following the standard ,Created in O'Connor, the
Court then employed the two-step inquiry, requiring reasonable suspicion and
in his concurring opinion in T.L 0., dissented, criticizing the plurality's application of the balancing
test to an investigatory search that he clearly found not to be a special need. Id. at 732 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, J.J.). Justice Scalia concurred with the
plurality's opinion but criticized its creation of a new standard of reasonableness. Id. at 729 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
103. Id. at 726; see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
104. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42.
105. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion); T.LO., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8.
106. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
107. Studies by the Federal Railroad Administration found that 1 of 8 employees drank at least
once a year while on duty and that at least 23% of railway employees were problem drinkers. Id. at
1407 n.1.
108. From 1972 to 1983, 21 significant accidents involving drug and alcohol use resulted in 25
fatalities, 61 injuries and approximately $27 million in property damage. Id. at 1407-08.
109. Id. at 1408. Courts consistently have held that drug tests are searches subject to the fourth
amendment. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390; Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1412-13. See generally Com-
ment, Behind the Hysteria of Compulsory Drug Screening in Employment: Urinalysis Can Be a Legit-
imate Tool for Helping Resolve the Nation's Drug Problem if Competing Interests of Employer and
Employee are Equitably Balanced, 25 DuQ. L. REV 597, 697 (1987) (extensive examination of em-
ployee drug testing programs).
110. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1408-09. Superiors also could order tests after a "reportable acci-
dent," a violation of specific rules or personal observations giving rise to a "reasonable suspicion" of
impairment. Id. at 1409.
111. Id. at 1414.
112. Id. at 1415-17.
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an appropriately conducted search. 113
The Court acknowledged that individual suspicion was "usually required
... before concluding that a search [was] reasonable."'1 14 However, the Court
cited United States v. Martinez-Fuerte15 for the proposition that minimal
searches could be justified on less than individual suspicion if an "important
government interest... [otherwise] would be placed in jeopardy."1 16 To qualify
the Skinner tests for this exception, the Court considered the regulations' effort
to reduce the privacy intrusion on employees and the nature of the regulated
industry, and determined that the tests were minimally intrusive. 117 The Court
completed its characterization by recognizing that a failure to allow these tests
on less than individual suspicion would jeopardize a great government inter-
est.118 Accordingly, the Court held the tests reasonable on less than individual
suspicion, finding reasonable suspicion satisfied by "the demonstrated frequency
of drug and alcohol use" and the "demonstrated connection between such use
and grave harm."' 19
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, labeling the balanc-
ing test "'a dangerous weakening of the purpose of the fourth amendment'"
and interpreting the removal of individual suspicion from the "special needs"
analysis as "eliminating altogether the probable cause requirement for civil
searches."' 120 In the cases from T.L.O. to Skinner the Court has taken the two-
step reasonableness standard, created in Terry as a very limited exception apply-
ing only to minimal searches, and made it the rule for all civil searches, regard-
less of intrusiveness, when the balance of interests found a warrant and probable
cause to be impracticable. The Court, however, did not use balancing as the
final determination of the reasonableness of the search. Reasonableness still re-
quired a somewhat objective showing of reasonable suspicion, which, following
Skinner, could be satisfied by particular suspicion of an individual or group from
which the individual to be searched was a member. 121 In Von Raab the Court
upheld for the first time the constitutionality of a search without any suspicion
of wrongdoing.
Von Raab's significance lies in its elimination of any level of suspicion as a
113. Id. at 1417-21.
114. Id. at 1417.
115. 428 U.S. 543 (1976); see supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
116. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561
(1976)).
117. Id. at 1417-18. Finding the tests minimally intrusive seems completely inconsistent with
the Court's finding the tests were searches because they invaded "an excretory function traditionally
shielded by great privacy." Id. at 1418.
118. Id. at 1419-21.
119. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (restating the Court's holding in Skin-
ner, which Justice Scalia joined).
120. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1425 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 357-58 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Justice Marshall
also filed his dissenting opinion in Von Raab based upon the reasons stated in his Skinner dissent.
Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For further discussion of Justice Marshall's
-dissent, see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
121. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1420-21.
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prerequisite for finding a search justified at its inception. Thus, courts may find
searches reasonable without any indication that the desired evidence will be
found. The Von Raab decision permits unwarranted intrusions into the privacy
of innocent citizens without any suspicion of wrongdoing, although the Court
had expressly denounced such intrusions in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.1 22
This new standard is apparently unjustified by the years of precedent constitut-
ing fourth amendment jurisprudence. Where a probable cause requirement
would have yielded unacceptable results, the Court always had limited the gov-
ernment's power to search by requiring some level of suspicion.1 23 The require-
ment of reasonable suspicion adopted for civil searches under the special needs
doctrine, although not so demanding as probable cause, had provided an objec-
tive safeguard for fourth amendment rights.124 However, the new Von Raab
standard, which does not require any level of suspicion, allows for any civil
search to be found reasonable, even without suspicion that the search will lead to
evidence. Leaving the courts free to determine reasonableness without any sus-
picion eliminates the consistent protection of citizens' privacy previously main-
tained by the objective standards of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
The Von Raab Court provided a three-step inquiry to determine reasonable-
ness. First, a court must determine whether the search serves a special need
"beyond the normal need for law enforcement." 12 5 Second, by balancing pri-
vacy and governmental interests in the particular context, the court must deter-
mine whether a warrant or any level of suspicion is practicable. 126 Finally, the
court must determine whether the search is reasonably designed to elicit the
information sought.' 27
After labeling a governmental intrusion a search 1 28 a court first must de-
termine that the search is not "designed to serve the ordinary needs of law en-
forcement." 129 This requirement is satisfied when the fruits of the search are
intended for purposes other than use in criminal prosecution. 130 In such cases
the search represents a "special need" that "may justify departure from the ordi-
nary warrant and probable cause requirements." 131
Under the special needs doctrine as it existed prior to Von Raab, the second
step would balance privacy and governmental interests to determine the practi-
cality of warrant and probable cause requirements.1 32 If impracticable, the rea-
122. 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975); see supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
123. Although the border searches in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976),
allowed searches without any particular individual suspicion, the evidence of frequent illegal entries
into the United States weighed heavily in the balance and provided some suspicion that searches
would detect illegal aliens. Id. at 551-53.
124. For a definition of reasonable suspicion, see supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
125. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1394.
128. See supra note 3 for the Court's definition of a search.
129. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390.
130. Id. at 1390.
131. Id. at 1390-91.
132. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989); supra notes
103-05 and accompanying text.
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sonableness standard would be implemented, requiring the search to be justified
at its inception and "'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.' ",133 'The Von Raab Court, however,
balanced to determine whether any level of suspicion was practical and, finding
the government's special need so great as to obviate the need for any suspicion,
held the intrusion was reasonable although no suspicion was present.' 34 Ac-
cordingly, the second step of the Von Raab standard is a balancing of interests.
This allows a court, upon finding the scales descending on the side of the govern-
ment, to approve a search even though no reasonable grounds exist for believing
that evidence sought will be discovered.
Finally, a court must determine whether the intrusion is reasonably
designed to elicit the information sought) 35 When "[i]n all the circumstances
... [the court is] persuaded that the program bears a close and substantial rela-
tion" to the government's goal, it should find the intrusion reasonably designed,
and the search as conducted will be found to satisfy the reasonableness require-
ment of the fourth amendment.1 36
The standard created in Von Raab eradicated any objective yardsticks for
measuring reasonableness and replaced them with the balancing test, criticized
by Supreme Court Justices 137 and legal writers.' 38 The balancing test would not
be the standard for fourth amendment reasonableness, however, if it did not
possess positive characteristics justifying its application.
In Camara v. Municipal Court139 and Terry v. Ohio140 the Court employed
balancing to create exceptions to the recognized standard of probable cause, but
in neither of these decisions did the Court attempt to provide any justification
for the new test. Even today, when balancing has become the standard of rea-
sonableness for all civil searches, no discussion of the propriety of the test has
ever been offered by the Court, other than the early justification based on low
intrusiveness and great public need.141 Accordingly, for support of the Court's
new standard, one must look somewhere other than to the Court.
Examining balancing on a practical level, one federal appellate court judge
proposed that balancing was a natural reaction to the "rising tide" of "a wide
variety of claims by individuals against the government" that were unique and to
which general principles had not been applied.142 Accordingly, balancing seems
133. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (plurality opinion) (quoting New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)); see supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
134. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394.
135. Id.
136, Id. at 1396.
137. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1423 (1989) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
138. See, eg., Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 972-83; Strossen, supra note 2, at 1184-1207.
139. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
140. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text.
141. See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 948-49; Strossen, supra note 2, at 117475 & n.5; see, e.g.,
Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
142. Coffin, supra note 12, at 21 (Judge Frank Coffin serves as a Circuit Judge for the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit).
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to provide a flexible and easily applied method for determining the reasonable-
ness of searches in situations never before encountered by the Court. Also, due
to a "backlog of opinions to write and cases to decide," this judge found a resort
to balancing a much easier approach than "theoretical... investigations of the
meaning of [constitutional] language and structure."' 143
On a theoretical basis balancing may be seen as necessary to a practical
legal system. Clearly, a balancing of interests must play some part in a fair and
democratic system of justice. 144 Because virtually all legal conflicts involve two
or more interested parties, two or more outcomes are always possible; "[h]ence it
is often said that a 'balancing operation' must be undertaken, with the 'correct'
decision seen as the one yielding the greatest net benefit." 14 5 The mere idea of
balancing conjures up an image of the goddess Themis, holding a pair of scales
with which she weighs the claims of opposing parties to make fair and just deter-
minations.1 4 6 This goddess, recognized as a symbol ofjustice, is also blindfolded
and remains impartial, unaffected by subjective influences and outside forces. It
is this characteristic of justice the balancing test lacks, leading to its most com-
mon and most serious criticism.
Without an objective "yardstick" for determining reasonableness, "the
[Fourth] Amendment lies virtually devoid of meaning, subject to whatever con-
tent shifting judicial majorities, concerned about the problems of the day, choose
to give to that supple term." 147 Because probable cause and the reasonable sus-
picion standard required an identifiable and quantifiable level of suspicion, rea-
sonableness could be found only where that level of suspicion existed.
Consequently, in the absence of this determining factor, a judge could only find
a search unreasonable and, hence, unconstitutional. Balancing interests to de-
termine the reasonableness of a search involves many factors, however, and the
selection of the factors to be weighed, the weight to be given each, and the final
determination are all left to the discretion of the judge. Each judge, due to indi-
vidual observations, training, and experience, inevitably will view each situation
and its unique facts from a different perspective. Additionally, no safeguards
prevent a judge from manipulating the factors to reach a result he desires.
Although advocates of the balancing test have addressed this weakness and of-
fered theoretical remedies, 148 it remains an obvious defect as evidenced by the
sharp division of the Court in the cases employing balancing under the "special
needs" doctrine. 149
143. Id. at 22.
144. See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 943 (quoting Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment,
94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2123-24 (1985)).
145. Id.
146. See Coffin, supra note 12, at 19 ("For it is she [Themis] whom Bulfinch has described as
'holding aloft a pair of scales, in which she weighs the claims of opposing parties.' ") (quoting T.
BULFINCH, BULFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY 18 n.1 (1934)).
147. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1423 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
148. See, eg., Coffin, supra note 12, at 22-26 (recognizing the "subjective bias" element of the
balancing test and recommending procedures for opinion writing to minimize its effect).
149. See, eg., Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1387 (four justices dissent from the majority's holding that
privacy interests are outweighed even in the absence of any suspicion); Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422
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The inevitable presence of judges' subjective opinions is evident from the
positions of certain justices in the various Supreme Court balancing cases. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, for example, consistently gives the greater weight to the gov-
ernment interest, especially where illegal drugs are involved, 150 but Justices
Marshall and Brennan consistently give greater weight to individual privacy and
the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause. 151 Because the test is
open to subjective influences, the Court's determination of reasonableness is
neither consistent nor predictable, and thus does not provide meaningful protec-
tion for fourth amendment rights.152
A second criticism of the balancing test is the impossibility of assigning
empirical values to the interests chosen to be weighed. "The problem for consti-
tutional balancing is the derivation of the scale needed to translate the value of
(Justice Marshall's dissent, joined by Justice Brennan, criticizing balancing and the result);
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 711 (1987) (plurality opinion) (four justices dissent from the
determination of reasonableness under balancing); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 326-27
(1985) (five separate opinions filed).
150. See, eg., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1407 (Chief Justice Rehnquistjoins majority upholding drug
tests); Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1384 (Chief Justice Rehnquist joins majority holding in favor of
government interest in drug testing case); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 711 (plurality opinion) (Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist joins plurality upholding searches of employee's office by his employer); Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 368 (1987) (Chief Justice Rehnquist delivers majority opinion holding for the
government interest in regard to drugs discovered during police inventory); United States v. Mon-
toya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 532 (1985) (Justice Rehnquist delivers majority opinion for gov-
ernment interest in body cavity search for drugs at airport); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 326 (Justice
Rehnquist joins majority upholding search of student's purse that contained marijuana); Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 221 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Justice Rehnquist dissents from
holding of unconstitutionality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 522 (1979) (Justice Rehnquist delivers majority opinion for government interests in
favor of body cavity search of inmates); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Rehnquist dissents from holding of unreasonableness of random vehicle stop for
registration check). But see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975) (Justice
Rehnquist concurs in result finding as unconstitutional roving border patrols stopping cars without
reasonable suspicion of the presence of illegal aliens, but asserts that situations exist that do not
require probable cause or reasonable suspicion).
151. See, e.g., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall dissent from majority's upholding of drug tests); Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissents from majority's upholding of suspi-
cionless drug tests); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Justices Brennan and
Marshall join Justice Blackmun's dissent from majority's allowance of search of state employee's
office); Bertine, 479 U.S. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Bren-
nan, dissents from majority's upholding of police inventory procedure); Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. at 545 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissents from
majority's allowance of lengthy detention at border on less than probable cause to allow check for
alimentary canal drug smuggling); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 370 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and con-
curring in part) (Justices Brennan and Marshall join in partial dissent from majority's upholding
search of student's purse); Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 202 (Justice Brennan writes for majority, holding
custodial questioning on less than probable cause unconstitutional; Justice Marshall is in majority);
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 563 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall
dissents and Justice Brennan joins Justice Stevens' dissent from majority's allowance of body cavity
search of inmates); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 649 (Justices Brennan and Marshall join in majority's rejec-
tion as unreasonable random traffic stop for registration check). But see Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at
874 (Justices Brennan and Marshall join majority in allowing as reasonable roving border patrol
stops of cars without reasonable suspicion of the presence of illegal aliens).
152. Strossen, supra note 2, at 1175-77 ("Fourth Amendment rights, like other constitutionally
guaranteed individual liberties, should receive the more certain protection resulting from categorical
rules rather than the less certain protection resulting from ... balancing.").
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interests into a common currency for comparison."' 153 Even assuming that the
personal prejudices of judges could be eliminated, there remains a question of
what value to assign each interest to allow balancing on a common scale.
Although the government usually can assemble a dizzying amount of statistics
and other data in support of its position, 154 the "privacy claim is highly subjec-
tive." 155 Each individual values his or her privacy differently and judges cannot
perceive accurate empirical values for the privacy interests of different
individuals. 156
The combination of the problems of subjective influence and common scale
leads to an uncontrolled standard, as evidenced by the Von Raab opinion itself.
Although the Court noted the high privacy expectations traditionally afforded
the act of urination, 157 when weighing the intrusion on privacy the Court de-
flated the privacy expectation to reach the desired balance.1 58 The Court gave
no explanation, however, why a right granted by the Constitution, even if depre-
ciated, would not outweigh the government interest.15
9
In addition to being able to manipulate the values assigned to interests, the
courts seem free to exclude important factors from the balance. The lack of
effective alternatives figured largely into the formation of the administrative
search exception 160 and the reasonableness standard,1 61 yet the Von Raab Court
failed to address this issue. This failure occurred even though the Court cited
statistics resulting from investigatory procedures other than drug testing.1 62
153. Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 973.
154. See, eg., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1407-08 & 1407 n.1 (statistics of drug and alcohol use and
the resulting cost in injuries and property damage); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
551-53 (1976) (statistics of illegal entries into the United States); see also Miller, Mandatory Urinal-
ysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward a General Rule of Legality under
the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 201, 203-04 (1986) (voluminous statistics on effect of
drug use on employment relationship); Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth
Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 1143 (1984) ("[t]he effectiveness of law enforcement is more sus-
ceptible to empirical proof than the extent of privacy concerns").
155. Note, supra note 154, at 1142.
156. Id. at 1142 & n.76.
157. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413.
158. The Court noted the employment relationship and the nature of certain highly regulated
government services as factors weakening the privacy expectations of employees. Von Raab, 109 S.
Ct. at 1393-94.
159. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 976 (questioning why even a weakened constitu-
tional right does not outweigh the government's interest).
The Constitution is the United States' highest law. Because the Court has interpreted the
fourth amendment as granting a right to privacy, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767
(1966), which it has held "basic to a free society," see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)), it would seem that great weight would be
accorded this interest. "Indeed, one may understand the Constitution, from the balancer's point of
view, as a document intended to ensure that judges (among others) treat particular interests with
respect. It is an honor roll of interests." Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 986.
160. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
161. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-27 (1968).
162. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392-93. In 1987, 24 employees were arrested following internal
investigations. Investigations in 1986 resulted in 37 employee arrests and those in 1985 resulted in
15 employee arrests. Id.
Although the Court does not state whether these arrests resulted from employee involvement
with illicit drugs, the statistics at least reveal the presence of successful alternative investigatory
procedures at the Custom Service's disposal.
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Following Von Raab, courts may find that every government employee
whose position may be made potentially dangerous by the use of drugs can be
subjected to drug testing without any evidence of drug use by the individual or
his or her peers. This will be possible because "the Court does not only resolve
individual disputes in constitutional cases; it establishes general principles of
governmental and individual rights." 163 Because the influence of such broad
balances is significant, the Court should consider the interests of nonparties po-
tentially affected by its decision, 164 yet it failed to do so in Von Raab.
Undoubtedly the greatest influence on the Court's decision, however, is the
subjective opinion of each Justice toward illegal drugs. The majority opinion is
replete with references to the problem of illegal drugs, not only to bolster the
weight of the government's interests, 165 but also to deflate the privacy interests
of the employees.166 Because no objective standard exists, the new standard of
reasonableness is unable to prevent judges' subjective opinions from entering and
affecting the outcome of a balance of nonweighable factors.
The balancing test as employed by the Court is prejudiced insofar as it
matches the "individual's privacy expectations against the Government's inter-
estS." ' 16 7 This statement of competing interests all but determines the outcome.
Rarely do individual interests impede the interests of the government and soci-
ety. Even so, individuals have a constitutional guarantee of individual privacy
under the fourth amendment, 168 and "viewing constitutional rights simply as
'interests' that may be overcome by other nonconstitutional interests does not
accord with common understandings of the meaning of a 'right.' "169 Also, pub-
lic and private interests appear on both sides.' 70 In Von Raab, for example,
each individual has an interest in effective border control and society has an
interest in preventing unwarranted governmental intrusions. The definition of
balancing as stated by the Court unfairly prejudices the balance in favor of the
government.
Yet another criticism of balancing is its lack of precedential value. "New
situations present new interests and different weights for old interests. 171 Be-
cause each case is based on unique factors and because balancing entails weigh-
ing "all the circumstances" present,172 a court must reconsider the proper
balance between governmental interest and privacy rights of individuals in each
163. Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 978.
164. See id.
165. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392-93.
166. Id. at 1394-95. Both dissenting opinions criticize the majority's emphasis on illicit drugs.
Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1433
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390.
168. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State.").
169. Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 987 (citing R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 194, 269
(1977)).
170. Id. at 981.
171. Id. at 980.
172. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396.
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case.173
There is only limited precedential value in the decisions, and experi-
ence shows that language used in one case in the search and seizure
field often has to be qualified or explained away when a different case
arises with slightly different facts. The result is an inherent amount of
uncertainty, and this uncertainty extends to the lower courts, which
have to try to apply the decisions of the Supreme Court.1 74
The uncertainty resulting from the lack of precedential value will leave lower
court decisions subject to question, which in turn will lead to a greater number
of appeals requiring greater use of already limited judicial resources.
The uncertainty resulting from use of the balancing test not only fails to
provide guidance to lower courts but also leaves no workable standard for those
officials in the field who have the responsibility of deciding the propriety of a
search. Under a balancing standard, officials will be uncertain of the constitu-
tional limits of individual searches until a court balances the specific facts. This
is true because it would be all but impossible for each individual to identify and
weigh all the factors present. Even after a court has balanced the factors in-
volved in a particular situation, differing fact patterns will continue to cause
uncertainty in the field.
In addition to these criticisms of balancing as the standard for determining
the reasonableness of searches, the Von Raab standard is also weak in its evalua-
tion of the reasonableness of the actual procedure implemented in a search. Af-
ter balancing determines whether any suspicion is necessary, the Von Raab
standard requires a search to be "calculated to advance the Government's
goal." 175 Under this vague requirement, apparently any test that promotes the
government's interests in any manner will be found reasonable in scope. Thus, it
appears the search method need not be the most effective or the least intrusive,
although it seems consideration of these factors would be integral to a finding of
reasonableness.' 76 For example, in Von Raab, there was no evidence of a drug
problem, but the Court found a need for drug testing to further the govern-
ment's desire to prevent the promotion of drug users. The Court cited instances
of injury and employee misconduct, 177 yet it cited no evidence that these inci-
dents resulted from drug use or that drug tests would prevent these
occurrences.
178
Furthermore, urinalysis seems an overly intrusive method for promoting
173. See, eg., Note, supra note 154, at 1130; see also Strossen, supra note 2, at 1187 ("Because of
their fact-specific nature, balancing decisions provide relatively little guidance concerning the consti-
tutional implications of other fact patterns.").
174. E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 40 (1975).
175. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395.
176. See Strossen, supra note 2, at 1176-77 (the "least intrusive alternative" requirement "re-
flects the 'basic and ethically powerful notion that government should not gratuitously or unnecessa-
rily inflict harm or costs' ") (quoting Spece, The Most Effective or Least Restrictive Alternative as the
Only Intermediate and Only Means-Focused Review in Due Process and Equal Protection, 33 VILL. L.
REV. 111, 135 (1988)).
177. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392-93.
178. Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the governmental goal. The government's interest is based on the effects of em-
ployee performance while on the job, yet the test discloses the employees' activi-
ties off the job. 179 As the Court stated, "the time it takes for particular drugs to
become undetectable in urine can vary widely depending on the individual, and
may extend for as long as 22 days."' 180 Accordingly, an employee who con-
sumes marijuana on Saturday night would fail the drug screening and, being
labeled a "drug user," would be subject to dismissal from the Service.' 8 ' The
government, however, provided no evidence demonstrating the use of drugs
while off duty affected the employees' on-the-job performance. An employee's
social conduct that remains independent from his work performance is of no
concern to the employer; therefore, drug testing, which allows the Service to
control the employees' off-the-job conduct by threat of dismissal, seems violative
of the employees' "right to be let alone." 182
Because the tests in some way promote the government's goal of preventing
the promotion of drug users, they satisfy the requirement of "advancing the gov-
ernment goal." Consequently, the Court found the drug tests reasonable under
the new test despite the fact that they were not justified on the evidence
presented and were more intrusive than necessary to achieve the government's
goal.
In his essay supporting the use of balancing, Judge Frank Coffin recognizes
that "the subjective presuppositions of judges and justices will play a part in
decisions and reasonable men and women will continue to disagree."' 83
Although he offers procedures for a theoretically practicable balancing test, he
criticizes its actual application when judges have taken advantage of the test's
susceptibility to manipulation.' 84 Balancing may necessarily play a role in jus-
tice, but this role must be one of a limited and carefully controlled exception as
analysis of balancing's weaknesses and manipulability reveal its unavoidable fail-
ure as a standard. Because judges are able to mention the interests involved
briefly and then magically arrive at some result, balancing presents a sort of
voodoo jurisprudence that provides little or nothing in the way of consistent
protection of the individual's right to privacy. While balancing's flexibility and
ease of application to new situations are appealing to an overburdened justice
system constantly facing new situations, these attributes cannot be enjoyed at
the expense of sacrificing constitutional rights.
179. Note, Taking the Sting Out of Employee Drug Testing, 8 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 527,
535 (1987).
180. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396.
181. See Note, supra note 179, at 535 (detection of off-duty drug use as grounds for dismissal).
182. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("They [the
framers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."), overruled, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Although the Court states its belief that drug users will be less sympathetic toward their mission
of drug interdiction, Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393, no evidence was presented that one who uses
drugs is any more likely to take a bribe or conspire with drug dealers than an employee who abstains
from drugs but who may be enticed by money. See id. at 1399 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. Coffin, supra note 12, at 40.
184. Id. at 22.
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If balancing is to be used, the Von Raab test should be modified to require
the presence of individual suspicion when balancing finds probable cause im-
practical before a court may hold a search "justified at its inception." The lower
level of general suspicion upheld in Skinner, while presenting some grounds for
believing the evidence will be found, is an unsatisfactory safeguard, leaving an
individual's right to privacy subject to violation based on the acts of others
rather than on his own actions. ' 85 Additionally, the test should require that the
method of search be the least intrusive means available to achieve the govern-
ment's goal effectively186 before a court may find the search reasonable in scope
and procedure.
For now balancing is the standard of reasonableness for civil searches and
"constitutional discourse [will become] a general discussion of the reasonable-
ness of government conduct"18 7 rather than an inquiry focusing on the constitu-
tional rights of individuals. In unprecedented fashion, Von Raab eliminated, for
the convenience of government, the safeguards surrounding the fourth amend-
ment that were meant to limit the government and to protect individual privacy
and freedom "'basic to a free society.' "188 Although a valid interest, the stand
against drugs, or any other perceived public need, cannot be allowed to infringe
upon the Constitution, depriving innocent citizens of their right to privacy. 189
The uncontrolled standard sanctioned in Von Raab, however, will allow subjec-
tive influences to determine the extent of constitutional rights, effectively freeing
government from its fourth amendment restraints and depriving each citizen of
the full protection intended in the constitutional guarantee of privacy.
HARLIN RAY DEAN, JNR.
185. Exceptions to this test would require the existence of an identifiable threat of great immedi-
ate harm known to exist because of past observations and experiences. This exception would provide
for the brief searches of passengers boarding commercial airliners, which the Court refers to in Von
Raab. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395 n.3.
186. See Strossen, supra note 2, at 1208-66 (proposing incorporation of the "least intrusive alter-
native" requirement and thoroughly analyzing arguments for and against it).
187. Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 987.
188. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 27 (1949)).
189. One commentator has noted:
The damnable character of illicit drugs should not blind our eyes to the mischief which will
surely follow any attempt to destroy them by unwarranted methods. "To press forward to
a great principle by breaking through every other great principle that stands in the way of
its establishment; ... in short, to procure an eminent good by means that are unlawful, is
as little consonant to private morality as to public justice."
Comment, supra note 109, at 597 (quoting Sir Walter Scott, The Le Louis, 2 DODSON. ADM. 210,
257, 165 ENG. REPRINT 1464, 1479).
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